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I. INTRODUCTION
Do startup firms consider taxes when they decide where to organize?
This Article analyzes the incorporation decisions of relatively new, US-based
private business enterprises with global ambitions. Such startup firms
generally organize as US corporations. This Article theorizes this dominant
structure and its exceptions, drawing from prior literature and illustrating
with informal interview results. It identifies explanatory factors including
limited tax benefits of non-US incorporation, legal benefits of US
incorporation, startups' liquidity and other resource constraints, and investor
preferences.
Part II explains the different treatment of US- and non-US-parented
multinational corporations (MNCs) under US federal income tax law. Some
non-US-parented MNC structures have tax advantages compared to US-
parented MNC structures. This prompts the hypothesis that US-based startup
corporations may incorporate outside the United States,' for example in a tax
haven jurisdiction, if the non-tax costs of a non-US incorporation decision
are sufficiently low.2
Part III reports that available empirical work shows few examples of
startup corporations headquartered in the United States and incorporated in
tax haven jurisdictions. Prior work4 and informal interviews reported here
1. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Do Strong Fences
Make Strong Neighbors?, 63 NAT'L TAx J. 723, 724 (2010) [hereinafter Desai &
Dharmapala, Strong Fences] (noting incentive for new firms with global business
plans to use a non-US parent corporation).
2. See Daniel Shaviro, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture The Rising Tax-
Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 383-84 (2011)
[hereinafter Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence] (noting that
the degree of electivity turns on "nontax consequences").
3. See, e.g., Eric J. Allen & Susan C. Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for
U.S.-Headquartered Firms: No Exodus Yet, 66 NAT'L TAX J. 395, 395 (2013)
[hereinafter Allen & Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S. -Headquartered
Firms] (reporting twenty-seven instances of tax haven incorporation among 918
identified US-headquartered multinational IPO firms).
4. This analysis builds on work that has considered the puzzle of the typical
startup's decision to organize as a corporation and not as an entity taxed as a
partnership. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1737 (1994) [hereinafter Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley
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support the conclusion that venture-backed Silicon Valley startups generally
organize in the United States, form corporations rather than partnerships or
LLCs, and prefer the state of Delaware as an incorporation jurisdiction.
Available examples, drawn in large part from initial public offering (IPO)
evidence, corroborate the conclusion that Delaware incorporation is the
norm. The evidence also reveals exceptions to the general rule of US
incorporation concentrated in particular industries, such as insurance and
marine transportation. Part III also identifies several additional examples of
US-based, non-US-incorporated firms, scattered among different industries.
Part IV explores several possible reasons for the dominant structure
of US incorporation for startup firms. One reason is the limited relative tax
advantages of non-US incorporation. For example, US-parented MNCs can
often obtain low tax rates on non-US income, sometimes access offshore
cash without onerous US tax results, and erode their US taxable income base
to some extent. Another reason is that a US-parented structure can provide
corporate governance and other non-tax legal advantages.
In addition, because US incorporation is a familiar "cookie cutter"
structure for startups, it requires fewer monetary and other startup company
resources. This is important to startups with liquidity constraints. Investor
preference, or at least investor familiarity with the Delaware corporate form,
also plays a role. Market participants share the perception that venture capital
(VC) firms, an important source of financing for startup companies, favor
investments in US corporations, although venture capitalists describe
portfolios that include investments that take a range of organizational forms.
Even if current US tax laws do not provide a significant incentive for
a typical startup corporation to incorporate outside the United States,
Congress could change these laws in the future so as to greatly increase the
tax burden placed on US-parented multinationals. Yet the possibility of
future change in US tax law does not appear to affect most startups'
incorporation location decisions. Startups have reason to discount the
possibility of future changes in US tax law adverse to US-parented MNCs
because of the strength and diversity of corporate lobbying efforts. Startups
and their advisors may conversely worry more about the possibility of
Start-Ups]; Victor Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture
Capital Start-ups, 57 TAX L. REV. 137 (2003) [hereinafter Fleischer, The Rational
Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital]; Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity
for a Venture Capital Start-up: The Myth ofIncorporation, 55 TAX LAW. 923 (2002)
[hereinafter Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Venture Capital Start-up]; Calvin H.
Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development
Deductions, 29 VA. TAX REv. 29 (2009) [hereinafter Johnson, Why Do Venture
Capital Funds Burn Research and Development Deductions]; Eric J. Allen & Sharat
Raghavan, The Impact of Non-Tax Costs on Tax-Efficiency of Venture Capital
Investments (April 16, 2013) [hereinafter Allen & Raghavan, The Impact ofNon-Tax
Costs on Tax-Efficiency] (available at ssm.com) (manuscript on file with the author).
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changes adverse to non-US-parented MNCs because they perceive a higher
likelihood of such changes inside or outside the United States. They also
likely face a higher degree of uncertainty about the possibility of adverse
changes applicable to non-US-parented firms.
Part V theorizes the noted exceptions to the dominant trend of US
incorporation for US-based startups. It suggests that tax factors may drive
some non-US incorporation decisions. For example, a favorable set of tax
rules supports a Bermuda incorporation decision for certain insurance
companies that cover US risks.
In addition, nontax legal factors play a role in encouraging some
firms to incorporate outside the United States. A number of tax and nontax
legal factors facilitate marine transportation firms' non-US incorporation
decisions, for example. Online gambling provides another example of an
industry in which regulatory factors have supported a non-US incorporation
decision.
Additional anecdotal examples of US-based, tax-haven-incorporated
firms also suggest that resource constraints and investor preferences
influence non-US incorporation decisions. With respect to resource
constraints, several US-based, non-US incorporated firms received funding
from deep-pocketed sources other than venture capital funds. In each of these
cases, one or more wealthy individuals, a large corporation or a private
equity firm made an up-front investment in a custom, tax-haven-parented
structure.
With respect to investor preferences, founder or investor links with
an incorporation jurisdiction might lead to a preference for non-US
incorporation. An investor preference for non-US incorporation might
proceed from current tax and non-tax legal considerations specific to the
investor, or simply from greater familiarity with non-US law on the part of
the investor or the investor's advisors. Separately, the investor might believe
that non-US incorporation would further the goal of positioning the startup
firm as a more attractive acquisition candidate.
II. WHY STARTUPS' PLACE OF INCORPORATION
MATTERS FOR TAX
A. Being a US-Parented MNC
US law uses a brittle place-of-incorporation rule to determine
corporate tax residence. A firm incorporated in Delaware that lacks any
corporate functions in the United States must still pay US corporate income
tax. A firm incorporated in Bermuda and headquartered in and managed
5. See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4).
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from the United States does not automatically pay US corporate income tax
by reason of corporate residence.
A typical US-parented MNC structure features a US corporate parent
that owns non-US operating subsidiaries through intermediate low-tax
holding corporations. Because the US rules treat separately incorporated
affiliates as separate taxpayers,8 non-US corporate subsidiaries of a US
parent are not automatically required to pay US federal income tax on all of
their income. Under applicable anti-deferral and other rules, a US-parented
MNC must currently pay tax on the income of its foreign subsidiaries to the
extent such income falls into the definition of "subpart F income"9 or is
distributed as dividend income, in each case subject to the reduction of US
tax under applicable foreign tax credit provisions.'0
US-parented MNCs use transfer pricing, deduction allocation,
income source and subpart F planning to allocate profits to low-tax
subsidiaries and use foreign tax credit planning, treaty planning, base erosion
strategies, and borrowing to minimize non-US taxes and the residual US
federal income tax due upon repatriation." As a result, the non-US income
6. See Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, supra
note 2, at 377-78 (2011) (noting the difference in US tax results that turns on place
of incorporation).
7. Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 706-09
(2011) [hereinafter Kleinbard, Stateless Income] (giving Google structure as an
example).
8. See Commissioner v. Bollinger, 485 U.S. 340 (1988); Moline Properties
Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
9. I.R.C. § 95 1(a). Subpart F is intended to impose current tax on mobile
and passive income. See, e.g., Lawrence Lokken, Whatever Happened to Subpart F?
U.S. CFC Legislation After the Check-the-Box Regulations, 7 FLA. TAX REV. 185,
192 (2005) (noting that subpart F does not target active business income); Stephen E.
Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 29, 29-30 (2004) (referring to
subpart F's targeting of passive and base company income).
10. See I.R.C. § 901 (granting foreign tax credit); § 902 (providing for
deemed paid foreign tax credit when foreign corporations distribute dividends to
certain US corporate shareholders); § 904 (providing foreign tax credit limitation
rules).
11. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Worse
Than Exemption, 59 EMORY L. J. 79, 85 (2009) (noting "overly generous" tax
benefits enjoyed by US corporations); Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 7, at
715-26 (arguing that the US international corporate tax system is an "ersatz
territorial" system); Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S.
Multinationals May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They
Really Dislike), 59 SMU L. REV. 751, 759 (2006) (explaining that "refined" tax
planning permits many US-parented MNCs to pay less under current rules than they
would under a territorial system). With respect to the important technology industry
strategy of offshoring intangibles at advantageous valuations, see Yariv Brauner,
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earned by US-parented MNCs often enjoys both a low foreign effective tax
rate and a low US effective tax rate.12 For example, it is estimated that the
US income tax burden on non-US business income earned by non-US
subsidiaries in MNC groups is perhaps between 3 and 6 percent.13
US-parented MNCs may also may seek ways to allocate income
related to US operations to low-taxed non-US affiliates, and conversely to
allocate deductions away from low-taxed non-US affiliates and to US
operations. 14 The ability of firms to erode the US tax base through such
planning has led some to conclude that the current US system raises less tax
revenue than would a "territorial" system that refrained from taxing non-US
Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing
Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79, 85-95 (2008).
12. See Harry Grubert, Foreign Taxes and the Growing Share of U.S.
Multinational Company Income Abroad: Profits, Not Sales, Are Being Globalized,
65 NAT'L TAX J. 247, 281 (2012) (reporting a decline in the average effective foreign
tax rate for non-US subsidiaries of US parent corporations from about 21 percent in
1996 to about 16 percent in 2004). See also ABA Tax'n Sec. Task Force, Report of
the Task Force on International Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAw. 649, 655-56 (2006)
("The effective rate of US and foreign income taxation of foreign income is
understood to be materially lower than the effective rate on domestic income.").
13. See Melissa Costa & Jennifer Gravelle, Taxing Multinational
Corporations: Average Tax Rates, 65 TAX L. REv. 391, 403-04 (2012) (reporting
based on 2007 Treasury tax return data an annual US tax on adjusted foreign-source
book income of about $18 billion, representing 3.3 percent of such income); see also
HARRY GRUBERT & JOHN MuTTI, TAXING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS INCOME:
DIVIDEND EXEMPTION VERSUS THE CURRENT SYSTEM 31-32 (2001) (reporting a 3.3
percent estimate for the overall burden of a dividend repatriation tax assuming an
excess limitation foreign tax credit position and a non-US effective tax rate below 10
percent); Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Where Will They Go if We Go
Territorial? Dividend Exemption and the Location Decisions of U.S. Multinational
Corporations, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 787, 797 (2001) (calculating a rate of 5.4 percent
based on certain assumptions including a 1.7 percent "excess burden" measure and
the US taxation of royalties from intangible assets).
14. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and
Tax Policy, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 703, 711, 717 (2009) (estimating "financial" income-
shifting and "real" productive asset location-shifting responses to higher US tax rates
and concluding that the financial effects, producing lost tax revenue of about $87
billion in 2002, were more than double the real effects). The OECD base erosion and
profit shifting, or BEPS, project lists as one of its headline goals "limit[ing] base
erosion via interest deductions and other financial payments." ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND
PROFIT SHIFTING 17 (2013).
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business income," although the revenue estimate depends on the details of
such a territorial system. 16
Once a firm has chosen a US-parented structure, it is difficult to
change to a non-US parented structure. Applicable rules require gain
* * 17
recognition (but prevent loss recognition) upon such an inversion.
Moreover, under an anti-inversion statute enacted in 2004,18 a MNC is still
treated as a US-parented firm even after acquisition by a foreign corporation
if (i) at least 80 percent of the foreign corporation's stock is owned by former
owners of the US parent (by reason of their former ownership of the US
parent) and (ii) the firm lacks substantial business activities in the country in
which the new foreign parent is incorporated.' 9 The anti-inversion statute and
related regulations leave room for US corporations to invert in connection
with an acquisition transaction, but severely limit options for stand-alone
inversion transactions.20 Policymakers may take an interest in whether
15. See supra note 11.
16. See, e.g., Harry Grubert, Enacting Dividend Exemption and Tax
Revenue, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 811, 814 (2001) (providing a static revenue gain estimate
of $9 billion based on 1996 Treasury data and evaluating possible behavioral
responses to territoriality adoption including "adjustments to overhead expenses and
royalty payments").
17. See I.R.C. § 367; U.S. TREASURY OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, CORPORATE
INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS (2002).
18. See I.R.C. § 7874.
19. See Jefferson P. VanderWolk, Inversions Under Section 7874 of the
Internal Revenue Code: Flawed Legislation, Flawed Guidance, 30 NW. J. INT'L L.
& BuS. 699, 699 (2010). Section 7874 also imposes other inversion restrictions, such
as a gain recognition requirement triggered by a lower ownership overlap threshold.
20. After the initial passage of section 7874, some firms took advantage of a
facts-and-circumstances "substantial business activities" test and expatriated to
create structures with parents in Ireland, Switzerland, and the UK. See Stuart
Webber, Inverted U.S. Firms Relocate Headquarters to Europe, 64 TAX NOTES
INT'L 589, 591 (Nov. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Webber, Inverted U.S. Firms Relocate]
(providing summary chart); Bret Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About
Corporate Inversions, 136 TAX NOTES 429, 430-36 (July 23, 2012) [hereinafter
Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions] (describing
different forms of acquisition and stand-alone inversion transactions). Recent
temporary and proposed Treasury regulations substantially curtail stand-alone
transactions by imposing a 25 percent threshold for sales, property, and employees
with respect to the substantial business activities requirement. See Temp. Reg. §
1.7874-3T; Kevin M. Cunningham, The New Section 7874 Substantial Business
Activity Exception Regulations: Closing the Door, 67 TAX NOTES INT'L 961, 962
(Sept. 3, 2012) (explaining the change from a facts-and-circumstances rule); Eric
Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of Larger Tax System Problems, 136
TAX NOTES 1449, 1454-55 (Sept. 17, 2012) [hereinafter Solomon, Corporate
Inversions: A Symptom of Larger Tax System Problems] (stating that inversion can
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startups' habit of incorporating in the United States will change under reform
alternatives that increase the tax burden placed on US-parented multinational
corporations (MNCs). In particular, they may worry that such reforms might
drive US-based startups to incorporate outside the United States instead,
taking economic activity with them.2'
B. Being a Non-US-Parented MNC
An alternative structure features an MNC headquartered in the
United States, but whose parent is incorporated in a non-US country. The
non-US parent might be incorporated in a tax haven that imposes a very low,
often zero, rate of corporate income tax,22 and treats foreign subsidiaries and
income favorably, for example through a territorial system that only taxes
domestic income exempts dividends distributed from foreign subsidiaries to
domestic parents.2 3 The non-US parent would typically own a US subsidiary
that houses the US management and US business operations, as well as other
subsidiaries incorporated in non-US jurisdictions.2 4
Tax treaty planning constitutes an important element of a non-US-
parented, US-headquartered MNC structure. A treaty relationship between
the non-US parent and the US subsidiary would substantially reduce the
continue via merger and acquisition transactions after the revised § 7874
regulations).
21. See, e.g. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE STAFF, TAX REFORM OPTIONS
FOR DISCUSSION: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 4 (May 9, 2013) (expressing
concern about US tax incentives for multinationals "to be foreign-based"); see also
Desai & Dharmapala, Strong Fences, supra note 1, at 724 ("In a global setting in
which formal corporate residence is increasingly elective, new firms that anticipate
generating significant amounts of non-US income will have an incentive to
incorporate their parent firm outside the United States."); Roger H. Gordon,
Discussion, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS
365-67 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008) (expressing the concern
that worldwide consolidation would encourage MNCs owned by US investors to
incorporate outside the United States and would encourage US investors to invest in
non-US corporations instead of US corporations).
22. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32
WORLD ECON. 1271, 1276-77 (2009) (giving example of an MNC parented by a tax
haven-incorporated firm and with "decentered" financial, legal and managerial
homes).
23. See, e.g., Webber, Inverted U.S. Firms Relocate, supra note 20, at 591
(providing recent examples of expatriation to European parent structures); Bret
Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate Inversions, supra note 20,
at 430-36 (same).
24. OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, CORPORATE
INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 12-13 (2002) (explaining
post-inversion tax treatment).
326 [Vol. 14:8
Tax Planning and Initial Incorporation Location
parent's chance of exposure to US tax because a treaty relationship increases
the threshold for business taxation from the US statutory "effectively
connected income" standard to the treaty-based "permanent establishment"
25
standard. A treaty relationship also reduces withholding taxes that would
apply, for example with respect to interest, dividend, and royalty payments
from the US subsidiary to the parent. 26 Because direct tax treaties between
tax havens and the United States generally do not exist, any treaty planning
for a US-parented structure with a tax-haven-incorporated parent would
typically rely upon intermediate affiliates with excellent treaty networks.27
25. See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TAX SECTION, REPORT
ON OUTBOUND INVERSION TRANSACTIONS 42-43 (2002), http://www.nysba.org/
Content/ContentFolders20/TaxLawSection/TaxReports/1014report.pdf [hereinafter
NYSBA, OUTBOUND INVERSION TRANSACTIONS REPORT] (outlining analysis in
support of Bermuda parent treatment as engaged in a US trade or business and/or
having a US permanent establishment). See generally Lawrence Lokken, Income
Connected with U.S. Trade or Business: A Survey and Appraisal, 86 TAXES, Mar.
2008, at 61. In one case, the Tax Court held that a foreign parent provided brokerage
services through its US subsidiary and therefore was engaged in a US trade or
business. See InverWorld, Inc., et al v. Commissioner, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 3231
(1996), T.C.M. (RIA) $ 1996-301, at 2104-12, reconsideration denied, 73 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2777, T.C.M. (RIA) 1997-226.
26. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 24 (2002)
(noting that a 30 percent withholding tax applies to "related party" interest payments
from US subsidiary to non-US parent in the absence of a treaty relationship).
27. Tax-haven parents with indirect US subsidiaries have used Barbados
and Luxembourg as intermediate treaty countries, for example. See NYSBA,
OUTBOUND INVERSION TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note 25, at 6, 19-20 (reporting
intermediate Barbados affiliate in 1994 Bermuda-parented Helen of Troy structure
and intermediate Luxembourg affiliate in 2001 Bermuda-parented Accenture
structure). Public disclosures typically do not make such intermediate structures
clear. For example, Michael Kors did not disclose an effectively connected income,
branch profits, or permanent establishment risk. Its list of subsidiaries includes a
Swiss "Holdings" affiliate that might serve an intermediate treaty planning role
between the British Virgin Islands parent and the US indirect subsidiary. See
Michael Kors Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-1) Ex. 21.1 (Dec. 2,
2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1530721/000119312511328487/
d232021dex21l.htm (listing subsidiaries). Freescale Semiconductor also does not
disclose such risks, although it does disclose that a shareholder's tax results might be
different if that shareholder received dividends or gains related to a US trade or
business of the shareholder. See Freescale Semiconductor Holdings I, Ltd.,
Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 180 (May 20, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1392522/000119312511146916/dsla.htm. Freescale, like Helen
of Troy and Accenture, has a Bermuda parent. However, its list of subsidiaries does
not include an intermediate Barbados or Luxembourg holding company or another
company whose name suggests that it is used as a treaty intermediate between
2013] 327
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Because the US rule for corporate tax residence turns on
incorporation location, not on management and control, a non-US-parented
MNC avoids exposure to US federal income tax on subpart F income earned
by non-US subsidiaries, so long as 10 percent-or-more-shareholders that are
US persons do not own more than 50 percent of the non-US parent. 28 In
addition, a non-US-parented MNC can use base erosion or earnings-stripping
strategies, under which a US subsidiary makes deductible interest or other
payments to its non-US parent, to reduce the amount of income subject to US
tax.29
Research on non-US-parented structures resulting from inversion
transactions undertaken prior to the enactment of the 2004 anti-inversion
rules suggests that the tax savings provided by such structures depends in
significant part on the success of earnings-stripping strategies. One study
shows no systematic increase in company valuation following the
announcement of an inversion.3 0 But another concludes that markets exhibit
more positive reactions to inversions in the presence of greater leverage.
This is consistent with evidence that earnings stripping results in lower post-
Bermuda and the US. A Swiss company appears to serve as an intermediate for
indirect European subsidiaries and a British Virgin Islands company as an
intermediate for several Asian subsidiaries. See Freescale Semiconductor Holdings I,
Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-lA) Exhibit 21.1 (May 20, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1392522/000119312511032381/dex211.ht
m (listing subsidiaries). InterWAVE provides a counterexample of an IPO firm that
discloses an effectively connected income risk. See interWAVE Communications
Int'l Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-lA) 81 (Jan. 28, 2000),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1095478/000091205700002759/000091205
7-00-002759.txt.
28. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Expectations and
Expatriations: Tracing the Causes and Consequences of Corporate Inversions, 55
NAT'L TAX J. 409, 421 (2002) [hereinafter Desai & Hines, Expectations and
Expatriations] (citing avoidance of subpart F as the frequently articulated reason for
corporate inversions).
29. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY,
CORPORATE INVERSION TRANSACTIONS: TAX POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13 (2002)
(discussing deductible payments resulting from intercompany debt and reinsurance).
30. See C. Bryan Cloyd, Lillian F. Mills & Connie D. Weaver, Firm
Valuation Effects of the Expatriation of U.S. Corporations to Tax-Haven Countries,
25 J. AM. TAX'N Ass'N 87 (2002).
31. See Desai & Hines, Expectations and Expatriations, supra note 28, at
435 (reporting correlation between higher leverage and favorable stock price
reactions upon inversion transaction announcement).
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inversion effective tax rates for inverted firms compared to a control
sample.32
III. US INCORPORATION: A DOMINANT STRUCTURE
WITH EXCEPTIONS
A. US-Based Startups Generally Incorporate in the US
A "startup," for purposes of this Article, is a relatively new private
business enterprise with global ambitions. This Article focuses on initial
incorporation decisions of "relatively new" firms and not on later changes in
a firm's place of incorporation, for example as a result of a standalone
inversion transaction, strategic acquisition, or private equity or other
financial acquisition. A "US-based" firm has a preponderance of ties to the
United States. In the IPO study cited in this Article, my co-author Eric Allen
and I used a definition of more than 50 percent US revenue, employees, or
identified real property to identify US-headquartered firms.3 3
Some of the material presented in this Article, including the informal
interviews, draws heavily from venture capital experience, although the
definition of "startup" used here is not limited to venture-backed firms. Other
sources of initial outside capital could include individuals, corporations,
governments, or investment groups other than venture capital firms. The
availability of data and prior work constitutes one reason for the focus on
venture capital experience. In addition, many venture-backed portfolio
companies happen to fall within the startup definition adopted for purposes
of this Article, since such companies often have or expect to develop global
components in their respective business plans.
Prior work that investigates the choice of organizational form by US-
based startups backed by US venture firms observes that US incorporation,
particularly Delaware incorporation, is the market norm.34 Venture capital
32. See Jim A. Seida & William F. Wempe, Effective Tax Rate Changes
and Earnings Stripping Following Corporate Inversions, 57 NAT'L TAX J. 805, 825
(2004) (finding an 11.6 percentage point post-inversion tax rate reduction).
33. See Allen & Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S.-Headquartered
Firms, supra note 3, at 403. This Article does not consider inversion transactions
undertaken by mature firms, including transactions prior to or after the 2004 passage
of anti-inversion legislation and transactions in connection with a cross-border
acquisition. Compare, e.g., Wells, Cant and the Inconvenient Truth About Corporate
Inversions, supra note 20.
34. See, e.g., Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra
note 4, at 1739-40 ("In almost all cases, the [portfolio firm] will be structured as a
corporation."); Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and
Development Deductions, supra note 4, at 50-51 (noting that corporate investors,
which could use losses if a startup firm had a pass-through structure, generally do
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investments generally use standard contract structures, including a C
corporation organizational form and a capital structure featuring preferred
and common stock. Lawyers maintain these contract structures and
influence them, just as lawyers have been shown to significantly affect a new
corporation's choice of domicile36 and client firms' choice of takeover
defenses or other structures over time.
Several interviews reported here support and add color to the
observation that that US incorporation is the norm for US-based startups.
One law firm partner said that "9.5 out of 10" startups used a Delaware
corporation; 39 the others used limited liability company (LLC) or California
corporation structures. Another said that "most VCs don't want to invest
except into a Delaware corporation."Ao Entrepreneurs agreed. One
characterized the VC expectation of Delaware corporate organization as
"cookie-cutter."4A Another entrepreneur reported that incorporation was an
not invest in venture capital funds); Allen & Raghavan, The Impact of Non-Tax
Costs on Tax-Efficiency, supra note 4, at 39 (finding that only seventeen out of 995
firms in a sample of venture-backed IPO firms from 1996-2008 had LLC status at
the time of IPO).
35. Convertible preferred stock provides an attractive tradeoff between
venture capitalists' goal of claiming a control stake in a portfolio company and their
goal of accessing maximum returns on their investment, for example in the event of
an IPO. The use of preferred stock also permits the use of tax-advantaged equity
compensation strategies for portfolio company employees. See Ronald J. Gilson,
Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from the American Experience, 55
STAN. L. REv. 1067 (2003) [hereinafter Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital
Market]; Ronald J. Gilson & David M. Schizer, Understanding Venture Capital
Structure: A Tax Explanation for Convertible Preferred Stock, 116 HARv. L. REV.
874 (2003) (presenting tax explanation).
36. See, e.g., Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559 (2002) [hereinafter Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO
Firms].
37. See John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses:
Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001) [hereinafter Coates, Explaining
Variation in Takeover Defenses]. See also Victor Fleischer & Nancy C. Staudt, The
Supercharged IPO, 67 VAND. L. REV. _ [hereinafter Fleischer & Staudt, The
Supercharged IPO] (forthcoming 2014) (presenting evidence of the impact of
professional networks on firms' use of a specific planning strategy).
38. Consistent with commitments made to interviewees, interviews cited in
this Article omit identifying details. No person was interviewed twice, and the
citations to different interviews therefore reference conversations with unique
individuals.
39. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Jan. 28,
2013).
40. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013).
41. Telephone Interview with San Francisco entrepreneur (Feb. 16, 2013).
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"absolute requirement" at the time of his company's first venture funding
and that his company reorganized from an LLC to a Delaware corporation at
that time.42 And an entrepreneur who had organized his firm as an LLC and
who was fully aware of the tax ramifications of different organizational
decisions reported that one reason he had avoided venture funding was to
avoid "dogma" including the heuristic of Delaware incorporation.43 As
discussed further below, VCs do invest in portfolio firms not organized as
Delaware corporations. Nevertheless, these comments reflect perceptions of
an industry norm.
The choice of Delaware incorporation involves three subsidiary
decisions. First, Delaware incorporation rejects the alternative choice of
home-state, for example California, organization. Second, it rejects the
option of organizing as an LLC taxed as a flow-through for US tax purposes.
Third, and most important for purposes of this Article, it rejects the option of
incorporating outside the United States.
With respect to the question of Delaware or home-state
incorporation, literature in the corporate governance area demonstrates that
US-based firms (or their lawyers) frame the incorporation location decision
largely as a binary choice between home-state and Delaware incorporation.4
Cited reasons for Delaware incorporation include the quality of courts, the
substance of corporate governance law, and the habits of advisors.
With respect to the question of organization as an LLC or
corporation, an LLC would permit investors to benefit from one layer of tax
rather than two in the event of a profitable startup, or to use the passed-
through losses more often generated by a startup. 45 The losses "burned" as a
result of venture capitalists' choice of a corporate form46 are estimated to be
worth "billions"4' and wasting them may seem "hard to reconcile with any
42. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Jan. 30, 2013).
A California corporation, like a Delaware corporation, forms the foundation for a
future structure as a US-parented MNC.
43. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Feb. 11, 2013).
44. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to
Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383 (2003); Daines, The Incorporation Choices oflPO
Firms, supra note 36; Jens Dammann & Matthias Schundein, The Incorporation
Choices ofPrivately Held Corporations, 27 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79 (2011).
45. See, e.g., Goldberg, Choice of Entity for a Venture Capital Start-up,
supra note 4.
46. Johnson, Why do Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and
Development Deductions, supra note 4, at 53.
47. Allen & Raghavan, The Impact of Non-Tax Costs on Tax-Efficiency,
supra note 4, at 3 (estimating lower bounds for the value tax benefit value of
foregone losses at $1.4 billion - $4.4 billion based on IPO evidence from 1996-
2011).
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strong form of efficient market hypothesis.A8 Yet contemporaneous work
shows that out of 995 venture-backed firms that conducted IPOs on US
markets between 1996 and 2008, only forty-eight firms initially organized as
LLCs, and only seventeen retained LLC status until the IPO. The few firms
that organized as LLCs were more profitable than those that did not.49 Prior
literature also considers the possible impact of factors that may favor
incorporation despite the tax advantages of LLC organization, including
limited ability to use tax losses among existing investors in venture capital
firms and reduced transaction costs that result from the relative simplicity of
C corporation organization.5 o
The question of US or non-US incorporation, which is the focus of
this Article, adds to the Delaware-versus-home state and LLC-versus-
corporation elements of a startup's organization decision. Available
empirical evidence shows that US incorporation is the dominant
organizational decision for US-based startup firms with global ambitions. In
particular, initial public offering data from 1997 through 2010 reveals that
fewer than 3 percent of identified US-based multinational corporations in the
data set incorporated in tax havens. In addition, fewer than 2 percent of such
firms incorporated in non-tax-haven, non-US jurisdictions."
Informal interview evidence corroborates the view that US
incorporation is the norm for US-based startups with global ambitions. One
entrepreneur, for example, characterized US organization as the undisputed
default rule, even, for example, for a startup that anticipated that the most
significant market for its product would be in Europe.52 One lawyer
48. Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra note 4, at
1767 (raising the possibility of a gambler's mentality).
49. Allen & Raghavan, The Impact of Non-Tax Costs on Tax-Efficiency,
supra note 4, at 2.
50. See Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra note 4,
at 1767-68 (considering reduced transaction costs and venture capitalists' collective
action problem); Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance ofStructuring Venture Capital,
supra note 4, at 139-40 (adding that venture capitalists generally would not benefit
from startup losses and that loss limitations prevent typical investors in venture
funds from taking full current advantage of losses produced by pass-through
portfolio companies).
51. See Allen & Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S. -Headquartered
Firms, supra note 3, at 407. The IPO data set excludes firms that stay private and
those that only list on non-US exchanges. It includes firms that were not "relatively
new" at the time of IPO, for example because a firm may have gone public for a
second time after a taking-private transaction conducted by a financial investor. In
addition, data as of the IPO date typically lags incorporation. See id. at 401-02.
Nevertheless, the study provides some support for the conclusion that Delaware
incorporation is the market norm for US-based startup firms.
52. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Jan. 30, 2013).
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responded to the question of whether the global elements of a client's plan
influenced advice on the place of incorporation for a firm. "No," he said.
"They have no money."53
Startups that are not US-based, on the other hand, may well
incorporate outside the United States, even if they receive funding from US-
based venture capital firms. Some firms that originate outside the United
States and initially organize as non-US corporations may keep their non-US
status after they move to the United States. Israeli-parented firms, for
example, comprise about 1 percent of the firms that conducted US-based
IPOs between 1997 and 2010.54 One lawyer recalled instances of such firms
retaining an Israeli-parented structure and establishing US subsidiaries, even
though the lawyer thought such an approach tended to produce inefficiencies
since two sets of lawyers were required rather than one. Another mentioned
Israeli and UK firms as examples of non-US-incorporated structures that
tended to survive the migration to the US venture capital market.5 6 This
contrasts with another reported approach, in which a non-US firm that wants
to access the US market reorganizes into a US-parented structure.57
Similarly, some venture capital firms maintain non-US offices or
assign certain partners to oversee non-US-based portfolio companies. These
portfolio companies may be organized under non-US law rather than US
law.58 Examples of foreign office locations include Israel, India, and China.
53. Telephone Interview with San Francisco entrepreneur (Feb. 16, 2013).
54. See Allen & Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S. -Headquartered
Firms, supra note 3, at 407.
55. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Jan. 28,
2013).
56. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 27,
2013).
57. E.g., Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013).
58. For example, Sequoia Capital manages portfolios of companies based in
India, see Sequoia Capital, http://www.sequoiacap.com/india (last visited June 3,
2013), and China, see Sequoia Capital, http://www.sequoiacap.cn/en/ (last visited
June 3, 2013). The website of Bessemer Venture Partners lists dozens of portfolio
companies based in India, Israel and Europe, some of which can be identified as
non-US companies by their "Ltd." suffix. See Bessemer Venture Partners,
http://www.bvp.com/portfolio (last visited June 3, 2013) (sort by Europe, India and
Israel geographies).
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B. Exceptions
The dominant structure of US incorporation for US-based startups is
subject to several important exceptions. This small set of examples of US-
based startups that incorporate outside the United States, and in particular in
tax havens, adds context to the default rule of US incorporation. The below
discussion covers exceptions in the insurance, marine transportation, and
online gambling industries. It also includes several other examples of firms
that do not follow industry lines.
Of nearly 3,000 firms in a dataset of IPOs on US markets between
1997 and 2010, only forty-seven were US-based, tax-haven-incorporated
firms. Of these, thirteen were insurance carriers, which generally insure US
risks.59 The structure of such an insurance company typically features a
Bermuda parent and a US subsidiary. The US subsidiary sources and
services the insurance policies covering US risks, while premiums paid to the
US subsidiary are substantially eroded by means of deductible reinsurance
payments made to a Bermuda affiliate.60 As described in Part IV, a collection
of rules, primarily tax rules, facilitates insurance firms' decision to
incorporate in Bermuda.
Marine transportation is the second industrial category identified as a
typical candidate for a US-based, tax-haven-incorporated firm structure in
the study of US IPO data. Four firms out of the forty-seven identified in the
IPO study were marine transportation firms.6' Each of the four firms
identified in the data set engages in commercial shipping, but other
59. See Allen & Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S. -Headquartered
Firms, supra note 3, at 413-15. Some of the Bermuda-parented insurance firms in
the IPO dataset fit the definition of startup used in this Article. As an example,
Validus Holdings Re, which went public in July 2007, disclosed that it was "formed
in October 2005" with the sponsorship of a set of private equity funds. See Validus
Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 2 (July 19, 2007),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1348259/000095012307010068/e28184a6s
vlza.htm.
60. See NYSBA OUTBOUND INVERSION TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra note
25, at 27-29 (describing Bermuda-parented insurance company structure).
61. See Allen & Morse, Tax-Haven Incorporation for U.S. -Headquartered
Firms, supra note 3, at 413-15. Some of the tax-haven-parented marine
transportation firms in the IPO dataset fit the definition of startup used in this
Article. As an example, General Maritime Corporation, a Marshall Islands
corporation which went public in June 2001, disclosed that it was "newly formed"
and would assemble vessels and support services assets from three different sources.
See General Maritime Corporation, Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 3-4 (June
12, 2001), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/l127269/00009120570151949/
a2051255zs-la.txt.
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international marine transportation businesses, such as passenger cruise lines,
also use tax haven parents.62
Online gambling provides another example of an industry in which
firms that target the US market have used tax-haven-parented structures. For
example, one leading company incorporated in Gibraltar conducted an IPO
on the London Stock Exchange in 2005 using a proxy statement that
reportedly disclosed that 90 percent of its customers were US.63 As further
discussed in Part IV, industry-specific reasons encourage the use of tax-
haven-parented structures for US-based firms in the insurance, marine
transportation and online gambling examples.
Other examples of tax-haven-parented, US-based startup firms resist
categorization along industry lines. Because of the small sample size and
inconsistency of data in publicly available disclosures, these examples also
resist statistical analysis. They include firms with less restrictive resource
constraints and/or non-US investors that own a significant percentage of
stock.
Firms with less restrictive resource constraints, including an absence
of dependence on deferred law firm fee arrangements or post-incorporation
venture capital financing, include several funded by established public
corporations such as Motorola," Sun 5 and Tyco International.6 In one other
62. Carnival, for example, incorporated in Panama in 1972 and operates as
a dual listed company with Carnival plc, a UK company organized in 2000. See
Carnival Corporation Annual Report (Form 10-K) 3 (Jan. 30, 2011),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/815097/000119312511018320/dl0k.htm.
Royal Caribbean reports that it "was founded in 1968 as a partnership. Its corporate
structure evolved over the years and the current parent corporation, Royal Caribbean
Cruises Ltd., was incorporated on July 23, 1985 in the Republic of Liberia. . . ." See
Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 1 (Feb. 25, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/884887/000104746913001567/a2213132zi
0-k.htm.
63. See Christine Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets:
Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling, and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U.
L. REv. 371, 415 (2006) [hereinafter Hurt, Regulating Public Morals] (reporting
PartyGaming IPO).
64. See Iridium World Communications Ltd., Registration Statement,
(Form S-lA) 99 (June 10, 1997), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
948421/0000950133-97-002150.txt (disclosing approximately 28 percent ownership
by Motorola, Inc.).
65. See OpenTV Corp., Registration Statement (Form F-lA) 3 (Nov. 19,
1999), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096958/0000950013099006648/00
00950130-99-006648.txt (disclosing that OpenTV began as a joint venture between
Thomson Multimedia S.A. and Sun Microsystems).
66. See TyCom Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 2, F-6 (July 24,
2000), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1 108511/0000950013000004016/
0000950130-00-004016.txt (explaining that the registrant formed as a wholly-owned
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case, a private equity investment fund sponsored a capital-intensive startup.6
A broad group of equity partners together with current profits apparently
funded Accenture's startup phase. Wealthy individuals sponsored firms
including RSL Communications.69
In addition, some US-based, tax-haven-parented startup firms have
major founders or shareholders with non-US connections. Some firms appear
to have started doing business outside the United States. 0 Others had major
non-US shareholders at the time of IPO, including corporate investors7' and
subsidiary of Tyco International Ltd., which would continue to own 89 percent of
the stock post-IPO).
67. See Aircastle Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 50 (Aug. 2,
2006), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1362988/000095013606006258/
filel.htm ("We were formed in October 2004 with a capital commitment of $400
million from funds managed by Fortress for the purpose of investing in aviation
assets.").
68. See Accenture Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 62-63, 73
(July 18, 2001). http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1134538/0000950130
01503127/dsla.htm (showing that no shareholder owned more than 5 percent of any
class of Accenture Ltd. shares, that its partners owned 82 percent of the voting
equity, and annualized after-tax profits exceeding $1.5 billion for each year of
operation following separation from Arthur Andersen).
69. Ralph Lauder funded RSL Communications. See RSL Communications
Ltd, Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 101 (Mar. 20, 1998), http://www.sec.
gov/Archives/edgar/data/1036297/0000889812-98-000682.txt (stating that Lauder
owned about 43 percent of the registrant's common stock prior to IPO). See also
Kerry A. Dolan, Srpska Calling, FORBES (Nov. 2, 1998, 12:00AM),
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/1998/1102/6210141a.html (describing RSL's "deep
pockets").
70. See Garmin Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-1A) 36 (Dec. 6,
2000), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1121788/000095013100006701/000
0950131-00-006701.txt (disclosing that Garmin "formed in Taiwan"); Vistaprint
Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-1A) 35 (Sept. 26, 2005),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1262976/000119312505190875/dsla.htm
(noting that business initially commenced in France, then moved to the US, where it
was conducted by a US corporation, which later amalgamated with a new Bermuda
company).
71. See interWAVE Communications International Ltd., Registration
Statement (Form F-lA) 75 (Jan. 28, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/ 1095478/000091205700002759/0000912057-00-002759.txt (listing Nortel
Networks Corp. as 22 percent shareholder pre-IPO); Iridium World Communications
Ltd., (Form S-1A) 99 (June 6, 1997), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
94 8 4 2 1/0000950133-97-002129.txt (disclosing approximately 11 percent ownership
by a Japanese-based consortium and 9 percent ownership by a German-based
investor pre-IPO); OpenTV Corp., Registration Statement (Form F-lA) 3 (Nov. 19,
1999), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1096958000095013099006648/000
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also including Michael Kors, which received most of its funding prior to its
2011 IPO from two non-US individual investors through their jointly held
investment vehicle.7 2
IV. EXPLAINING THE DOMINANT STRUCTURE
A. Limited Tax Benefits of a Non-US-Parent Structure
The tax benefits of a non-US-parented structure derive from three
possible factors. First, a non-US-parented structure may reduce the current
tax paid by a MNC with respect to non-US income. Second, it may reduce
the tax paid upon the repatriation of income from subsidiaries to the MNC
parent. Third, it may reduce the current tax paid by an MNC with respect to
US income.
The tax-efficient structures of many US-parented MNCs initially
suggest that a startup has little to gain from a non-US-parented structure. The
effective rate of US income tax collected on non-US income earned under
US-parented structures is already very low. 73 Even if a non-US-parented
structure brings the rate of current US taxation on non-US income closer to
zero, it may not result in significant cost savings.
A non-US-parented structure might also permit the tax-efficient
repatriation of profits to the parent company, for example for the purpose of
dividend distributions to ultimate shareholders. Under the currently dominant
US-parented MNC structure, a firm pays US income tax less foreign tax
credits, in addition to withholding taxes, when the MNC repatriates profits
from a foreign subsidiary to the US parent. Some firms, in particular
technology firms, can achieve very low rates of non-US tax rate on non-US
income. As a result, they may have less ability to use foreign tax credits to
shelter US income tax upon the repatriation of profits.74
0950130-99-006648.txt (disclosing that OpenTV began as a joint venture between
Thomson Multimedia S.A. and Sun Microsystems).
72. See Michael Kors Holdings Ltd., Registration Statement (Form F-i) 87-
88 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1530721/0001193
12511328487/d232021dfl.htm (disclosing approximately 52 percent pre-IPO
beneficial ownership by Silas K.F. Chou, a Hong Kong individual, and Lawrence S.
Stroll, a Canadian individual).
73. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (reviewing data on US
taxation of non-US income of US-parented MNCs).
74. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Repatriation Taxes,
Repatriation Strategies and Multinational Financial Policy, 87 J. PUB. EcoN. 73,
74-75 (2002) (noting the connection between lower foreign tax rates and higher
incentives to avoid repatriation). It is possible for a US parent to benefit from
offshore cash without a taxable repatriation in some circumstances, as high-profile
cases illustrate. See, e.g., Peter Burrows, Apple Avoids $9.2 Billion in Taxes With
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Many US-parented firms have substantial profits that remain
offshore, in part because of the residual tax expense of repatriation.7 A non-
US-parented structure would remove this residual US tax obstacle to
repatriation from a US subsidiary to a foreign parent. Such a non-US-
parented structure presents other planning challenges, however, including the
challenge of how to avoid withholding taxes on such a repatriation payment.
Withholding taxes are generally charged at rates as high as 30 percent on
related party interest or dividends paid by a US firm and on royalties paid for
the use of US intellectual property,16 and treaty planning is presumably
necessary to reduce these taxes.n
The possible reduction in tax on US income as a result of a non-US-
parented structure also deserves consideration. Evidence from inversion
transactions suggests that the main benefit of transforming from a US-
parented to a tax-haven-parented corporation lies in the reduction of tax on
US income, not in the reduction of tax on non-US income. Inverted
companies erode the tax base of their US operating subsidiaries through
strategies such as intercompany leverage, which results in deductible
payments from US subsidiaries to non-US parents. Empirical evidence
indicates that the benefit of an inverted transaction to a firm correlates with
the availability of such base erosion strategies, although base erosion can
also feature in US-parented structures.
Importantly, all three of these advantages - reduction of tax on non-
US income, reduced tax upon repatriation, and reduction of tax on US
income - will benefit a mature and profitable firm more than a loss-making,
newly-formed startup corporation. For example, in order to take advantage of
a non-US-parented structure to reduce tax on US income, a firm needs
taxable income and the capacity to establish intercompany agreements that
support deductible payments from the US to the non-US parent. Many
startups have neither.
Finally, a startup incorporated outside the United States that has US
shareholders faces the risk of categorization as a passive foreign investment
company, or PFIC. A foreign corporation is a PFIC if passive income makes
Debt Deal, Bloomberg, May 3, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-
02/apple-avoids-9-2-billion-in-taxes-with-debt-deal.html.
75. See Susan C. Morse, A Corporate Offshore Profits Transition Tax, 91
N.C. L. REv. 549, 550 (2013) (referencing estimate of $1 trillion to $2 trillion of
untaxed offshore earnings).
76. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 861 (providing source rules), 881 (taxing non-US
corporations on the receipt of certain US-source income).
77. See supra notes 25-27 (discussing tax treaty planning in the context of
non-US-parented firms' access to permanent establishment rules).
78. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text and 29-32 and
accompanying text (reviewing base erosion strategies of US-parented and inverted
firms).
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up at least 75 percent of its gross income or assets held to produce passive
income make up at least 50 percent of its total asset value.79 Concern about a
startup's PFIC status can result from current operating losses together with
investment income produced by working capital, including working capital
attributable to IPO proceeds. PFIC status imposes unattractive tax results on
US shareholders.s0 Registration statements for non-US-parented MNCs that
go public typically disclose the possibility of PFIC status,8 ' and PFIC status
presents a concern for shareholders of private companies as well, despite a
- - 82limited start-up company exception.
B. Legal Benefits of a US-Parent Structure
A US-parent structure, meanwhile, provides non-tax legal benefits.
US incorporation provides the benefit of access to Delaware corporate
governance law, for example, and non-US incorporation does not.83 Startup
advisors also perceive an advantage to US incorporation for purposes of the
protection of intellectual property and other property rights.
The corporate governance advantages of US incorporation include
access to relatively investor-friendly and highly reliable Delaware or other
state corporate governance law.84 The 2011 registration statement for
Michael Kors, incorporated in the British Virgin Islands, lists risk factors
related to the difficulty of initiating shareholder derivative actions, enforcing
79. See I.R.C. § 1297.
80. These results include the possible imposition of the maximum ordinary
income tax rate on "excess distributions" including gain on sale of stock, together
with an interest charge. I.R.C. § 1291.
81. See, e.g., Freescale Semiconductor Holdings I, Ltd., Registration
Statement (Form S-lA) 179 (May 20, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1392522/000119312511146916/dsla.htm; Michael Kors Holdings Ltd.,
Registration Statement (Form F-1) 114 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1530721/000119312511328487/d232021dfl.htm. See also
Aircastle Ltd., Registration Statement (Form S-lA) 36 (Aug. 2, 2006),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1362988/000095013606006258/filel.htm
(disclosing that the firm expected to be categorized as a PFIC and as a CFC).
82. See I.R.C. § 1298(b)(2).
83. See Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and
International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1239-40 (2008)
(contrasting "corporate surplus" and "tax surplus").
84. Id. at 1255-58 (arguing that the first-best solution to the problem of
corporate tax consequences influencing corporate governance choices is to segregate
them so that tax results follow from a "real seat" rule while corporate governance
results follow from a "place of incorporation" rule).
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judgments against officers and directors, and pursuing minority or other
shareholder rights."
Related research that investigates companies that cross-list on
different securities markets indicates that cross-listed firms trade at a
premium because their willingness to comply with stricter accounting,
disclosure, and other rules serves as a "bonding" signal that encourages
investors to invest.8 6 Structures subject to less regulatory oversight may
permit more rent extraction by corporate managers, particularly in widely
held corporations;87 or make transparent reporting of earnings more elusive.
Even if non-US incorporation saves corporate governance costs, for example
by reducing compliance costs produced by Sarbanes-Oxley and other US
89
regulatory requirements, investors may experience the absence of tighter
corporate governance regulation as a net disadvantage.
Informal interview results corroborate some of these corporate
governance concerns with non-US incorporation. One lawyer explained that
using a Delaware corporation ensured that an investor would be protected
under US law, for example because board and/or shareholder votes would be
required for certain corporate actions and because investors could limit the
amount of capital exposed to non-US law, for example through contract
limitations on how much of the investors' cash could be transferred to a
foreign subsidiary of a US parent. 90 One venture capitalist explained that it
was generally not advisable for VCs to invest in a firm formed outside the
US, because of the risk that non-US governments might take over a company
85. See Michael Kors Holdings Limited, Registration Statement (Form F-1)
25-26 (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1530721/00011
9312511328487/d232021dfl.htm (listing risk factors related to corporate
governance).
86. See, e.g., John C. Coffee Jr., Racing Toward the Top?: The Impact of
Cross-Listings and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate
Governance, 102 CoLUM. L. REV. 1757 (2002).
87. See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management,
Corporate Tax Shelters, and Book-Tax Alignment, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 169 (2009);
Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm
Value, 91 REV. ECON. STAT. 537 (2009) (finding a correlation between institutional
ownership and tax avoidance); Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax
Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax
Shelter Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 126 (2009) (finding smaller stock price
declines for firms with good governance).
88. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 263-
64 (2010) (discussing "opacity costs").
89. See Kate Litvak, The Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act on Non-U.S.
Companies Cross-Listed in the U.S., 13 J. CORP. FIN. 195 (2007).
90. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
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or otherwise unilaterally reduce the value of an investment." Another
venture capitalist whose firm's portfolio included non-US-parented
companies said that such non-US investments were more common in a
transaction in which the investment firms owned a controlling interest in the
portfolio company, in which case corporate governance concerns might have
less importance.92
The importance of corporate governance is also suggested by the
exceptions to the rule of US incorporation for US-based startups. One lawyer
explained that a startup with an Israeli or UK parent would often keep its
offshore parent instead of migrating to a US-parented structure when
entering the US market.93 One venture capitalist cited Europe as an exception
to the rule of the strong preference for Delaware incorporation because of a
higher level of comfort with European law.94
Property protection may provide another reason to choose a US-
parented structure for a startup.95 One lawyer said flatly with respect to IP
development, "I want them to do it in the US, to be honest." But this
preference had more nuance. The lawyer had discomfort with the idea of a
development team or IP ownership in India or China, but accepted the idea
that IP might be developed or owned in Switzerland.96 Another lawyer
emphasized a remedies advantage of US court jurisdiction over Delaware
corporations, which the lawyer said ensured the ability to sue and recover
damages if successful in the event of a controversy. 97 This focus on local
91. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Feb. 8,
2013).
92. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture/private equity fund
partner (Feb. 22, 2013).
93. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 27,
2013). Other lawyers also mentioned an exception for Israeli firms. See, e.g.,
Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Jan. 28, 2013).
94. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Feb. 8,
2013).
95. Formal legal rules generally do not sanction different IP protection by
one country if the IP is held by a firm incorporated in a different country.
International intellectual property conventions include anti-discrimination
requirements. See ROBERT P. MERGES, PETE S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 55 (6th ed. 2012).
Nevertheless, the prospect of defending intellectual property rights in a jurisdiction
other than the jurisdiction of incorporation may increase uncertainty for reasons
including concern about de facto differences in the application of the law. See, e.g.,
Rama Lakshmi, India Rejects Novartis Drug Patent, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia-pacific (reporting on Indian Supreme
Court case denying protection for an improved form of a pre-existing compound and
suggesting that the case might discourage foreign pharma investment in India).
96. Telephone Interview, San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16, 2013).
97. Telephone Interview, Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4, 2013).
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presence appears to derive in part from legal realism concerns. An investor
with an office in India, for example, may have higher confidence as a
practical matter about its ability to get a hearing and a remedy in Indian
court.98
C. Liquidity and Other Resource Constraints
As prior literature observes, business frictions can interfere with tax-
motivated planning.99 Even if a structure with a parent in a low-tax
jurisdiction offered tax advantages that clearly outweighed corporate
governance and other legal disadvantages, certain business frictions,
primarily liquidity and other resource constraints, would likely prompt many
startups to continue to choose Delaware incorporation. Liquidity constraints
partly explain the premium placed on simplicity in the default startup
structure. Declining to search for an optimal organizational structure and
instead accepting the "satisfactory solutio[n]" provided by the dominant
heuristic of Delaware incorporation also saves non-cash resources.100
Other work has noted the importance of cash conservation and the
up-front and ongoing expense of nonstandard structures for startup firms.10
Interview evidence also supports the conclusion that many startups have
severe liquidity constraints. One entrepreneur admitted that he and his co-
founder were "very cheap" and simply "never brought in outside legal
counsel" until financing. 10 2 Another explained that "you want to defer
expense as far as possible." 03 One lawyer reported that startups often had
98. Telephone Interview, Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4, 2013).
99. See generally David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax
Planning, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1323-35 (2001) (evaluating impact of
behavioral distortions on tax planning choices); David A. Weisbach, Line Drawing,
Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627, 1665-68 (1999)
(same).
100. Herbert A. Simon, Rational Decision Making in Business
Organizations, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 498 (1979). See generally DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011) (distinguishing between automatic
and heuristics-based "System 1" decisions and energy-demanding "System 2"
decisions).
101. See, e.g., Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra
note 4, at 1749-50 (noting the often-mentioned reason for incorporation of
minimizing legal and organizational costs). Planning related to non-US income may
account for a substantial part of the total cost of US-parented firms' tax compliance.
See Marsha Blumenthal & Joel B. Slemrod, The Compliance Cost of Taxing
Foreign-Source Income: Its Magnitude, Determinants, and Policy Implications, 2
INT'L TAX & PuB. FIN. 37 (1995).
102. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Jan. 30, 2013).
103. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Feb. 11, 2013).
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difficulty meeting costs in the thousand-dollar range prior to venture
investment. A good startup attorney, he said, "understands the need to
conserve cash."'" One venture capitalist could not think of an example
where an early globalization strategy requiring significant up-front capital
investment had improved a startup's valuation. Such plans "take a lot of
money," and when "the music stops," for example prior to the company
achieving self-sufficiency through a revenue stream, the capital is gone. os
Reluctance to slow down business plan implementation may limit
startups' focus on legal issues generally. One entrepreneur reported that
"legal is the last thing on my mind;" when a prospective strategic acquirer
asked him "how many compliance people" he had, he was struck by the fact
that the acquirer had "the luxury of asking that question. Another
entrepreneur explained that even though unfavorable customer agreements
had required renegotiation at the time of acquisition, costing time and
money, the company would not necessarily have invested in legal review of
the agreements even with the benefit of hindsight, since such review would
have slowed down sales.107
Startup lawyers triage the legal issues they recommend that their
clients address. Issues like intellectual property ownership and a clean
capitalization table take precedence over organization decisions.'s Startup
lawyers readily give examples of startups that have stumbled over IP
ownership or "founder in the woodwork"' 09 problems. In contrast, they
generally do not see evidence that organizing as anything other than a
Delaware C corporation changes the startup firm's chances of a successful
exit or the likely valuation of that exit. "0
Resource constraints encourage startups to prefer the simplest
organizational structure: the Delaware C corporation. This organizational
choice is simple in part because of path dependence; it is the "cookie-cutter"
structure,'' the "pre-approved" package,'12 the "gold standard,"" 3
104. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
105. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Feb. 8,
2013).
106. Telephone Interview with San Francisco entrepreneur (Feb. 16, 2013).
107. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Feb. 30, 2013).
108. E.g., Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Jan.
28, 2013) (explaining the importance of "buddy" issues relating to co-developed IP
and emphasizing the importance of focusing on "the most high level issues").
109. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Feb. 8,
2013).
110. E.g. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb.
16, 2013) ("I don't think there's any example of people getting extra money for [an
offshore structure].").
111. Telephone Interview with San Francisco entrepreneur (Feb. 16, 2013).
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"dogma,"1 1 4 the "generally accepted norm.""' Under current practice,
Delaware corporations are simpler than LLCs or partnerships and also
simpler than US-based non-US corporations.
Important examples of Delaware corporation simplicity identified in
the corporation-versus-LLC literature include employee options, corporate
governance, and exit strategy, 1 6 although it would surely be possible to
optimize and simplify a different structure if it were widely used.'
Similarly, Delaware organization is simpler than non-US organization for
US-based startups. The addition of non-US entities to the mix adds more
complexity because the relevance of different laws requires more than one
set of legal and other advisors.' 18 Managing multiple corporate entities and
related agreements between them complicates the project of running the
company." 9
Available resources for efficient corporation formation services for
startups lean toward a Delaware corporate structure, especially the resources
provided by law firms. A founder looking for online advice about how to
organize a startup will soon find LegalZoom, which provides form
documents for LLCs as well as S and C corporations.12 0 However, the online
112. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
113. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Feb.
22, 2013).
114. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Feb. 11, 2013).
115. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
116. See Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture
Capital, supra note 4, at 167-84 (explaining reasons why venture capitalists may
stick with the "devil they know").
117. See Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra note 4,
at 1767-68 (considering venture capitalists' collective action problem).
118. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Jan. 28,
2013).
119. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013) (characterizing the use of an offshore intellectual property holding company
subsidiary as "very expensive" tax planning that "completely breaks the idea
of simplicity"); Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Jan. 30,
2013) (explaining that setting up places of business in different global locations was
"much more difficult than we anticipated," due to issues like local bank account and
office requirements).
120. Legal Zoom provides a choice among the US states for jurisdiction of
organization but does not mention the possibility of offshore incorporation. See
LEGAL ZooM, http://www.legalzoom.com/ (last visited July 11, 2013).
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term sheet generators supported by large Silicon Valley law firms assume a
C corporation structure.121
Law firms have standardized and made cost-effective the formation
of a startup as a Delaware corporation. More than one lawyer put the current
cost of the "thirty-plus" documents needed to form a company, ranging from
articles of incorporation to employee option plans, at $2000-$3000.122
Uniform questionnaires facilitate the process, as do, at least in some cases,
law firm outposts located in low-cost locations. 123 In contrast, documents for
a firm that organizes as an LLC might cost $10,000 and forming a Bermuda
corporation, perhaps $30,000. 124
The dominance of the Delaware corporate form permits not only
upfront cost savings, but also lower diligence costs in the event of later
transactions. One lawyer explained the approach of organizing each startup
firm with the same number of shares of authorized common stock and a
similarly sized option pool. The uniform approach permitted the easy
conversion of financing terms to a preferred stock price, and the expression
of most preferred stock pricing as a figure in the range of twenty-five cents
to one dollar for each share of preferred stock. Since this approach is similar
to other firms' approach, it makes negotiating more straightforward and
diligence less expensive.1 2 5
A cost difference in the thousands of dollars may seem an
insufficient reason to choose one organizational approach over another for a
corporation that might be worth billions of dollars someday. Yet this cost
differential is important for a startup firm that makes its organizational
decision before it obtains outside financing. For example, it may make the
decision in connection with a preliminary round of financing in which it
seeks smaller investments from friends and family or from angel investors.
Startups may also begin work on their business plan without significant
121. For example, the "Series Seed" documents developed by a Fenwick &
West lawyer assume a Delaware corporation. See SERIES SEED FINANCING
DOCUMENTS, http://www.seriesseed.com/posts/documents.html (last visited July 11,
2013). See also Wilson Sonsini, Term Sheet Generator, http://www.wsgr.com/
WSGR/Display.aspx?SectionName-practice/termsheet.htm (last visited July 11,
2013) (giving jurisdiction options of Delaware, California or "Other" and assuming
as the next step the issuance of preferred stock).
122. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013); see also Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
123. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013).
124. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
125. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
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venture capital financing in particular in areas that require little capital
investment, such as the development of mobile or cloud software
applications. 126
In some cases, law firms' willingness to defer startups' obligation to
pay legal fees contributes to lawyers' reluctance to recommend "exotic"
structures. 12 7 The fee deferral limit might range from $15,000128 to
$25,000129 and accordingly will not cover the expense of offshore
incorporation. The limit puts the attorneys at risk for the amount of the
deferred fees in the event the startup fails to achieve financing, and lawyers
may not consider the investment worthwhile. One lawyer said that he would
be happy to implement a complex structure if he were paid "full freight," but
not "on a deferred fee basis." 30
The reluctance to spend resources on a nonstandard corporate
structure is consistent with the view that venture capital firms do not place
any value on such a structure. Prior research suggests that venture capitalists
insist on a Delaware corporate structure for their portfolio companies.
However, three venture capitalists informally interviewed did not go so far
and instead denied that they filtered out corporations that were organized as
other than Delaware corporations. The investors generally acknowledged
126. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Jan. 28,
2013) (noting the emergence of low-capital business models).
127. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 27,
2013).
128. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 27,
2013).
129. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013).
130. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013).
131. See Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra note 4,
at 1767-68 (attributing corporate structure decisions to venture capitalists); Gilson,
Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 35 (same); Johnson, Why Do
Venture Capital Funds Burn Research and Development Deductions, supra note 4,
at 89 (same). Researchers have similarly reported that private equity ownership of
portfolio firms correlates with tax planning. See, e.g., Brad A. Badertscher, Sharon
P. Katz & Sonja 0. Rego, The Separation of Ownership and Control and Tax
Avoidance, 56 J. ACCT'G & EcoN. 228, 242 (2013) (reporting that portfolio
companies controlled by private equity firms had higher tax avoidance measures
than management-owned companies); Steven N. Kaplan & Per StrOmberg,
Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 134-35 (2009)
(noting tax benefits of additional leverage in private equity-owned portfolio
companies).
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their preference for Delaware incorporation, but also expressed the view that
"the lawyers" overstated this preference. 132
One venture capitalist cited portfolio companies that were
incorporated in various US states as well as outside the United States and in
LLC form. 13 3 Another said that organizational form was not something the
firm sought to "optimize."1 34 Firms may rely on the judgment of earlier
investors in a portfolio company or on the judgment of co-investors and to
accept their planning with respect to organizational form.'35 Some venture
firms have investment fund segments that specifically target non-US
portfolio companies, which are typically organized as non-US firms. 13 6
The norm of US incorporation may derive less from venture capital
preference and more from the involvement of lawyers that advise startup
firms. 13 7 Lawyers have developed an out-of-the-box structure for startup
firms that is easy and cheap to implement because it is so frequently
replicated. The lawyer's interests and the startup's issues are generally
closely aligned with respect to the goal of conserving cash and other
resources, particularly if the lawyer has agreed to defer fees. As one lawyer
explained, if startups have "no revenue," and "no product," they have "no
future,"13 ' and cannot pay their legal bills. Other work demonstrates that
lawyers can significantly influence client legal decisions, including state of
incorporation,139 use of takeover defenses, 140 and aggressive structures to
permit founder liquidity.14 1
132. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Feb. 8,
2013) (stating that the California code was "stable" and "good enough" and that LLC
formation "can be fixed later," when "institutional investors" are involved).
133. Telephone Interview with San Francisco entrepreneur (Feb. 16, 2013).
Contemporaneous examination of venture-backed IPO evidence also finds some
evidence of a small number of venture-backed LLCs. Allen & Raghavan, The Impact
of Non-Tax Costs on Tax-Efficiency, supra note 4.
134. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Mar. 8,
2013).
135. Telephone Interview with San Francisco entrepreneur (Feb. 16, 2013);
Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley venture fund partner (Mar. 8, 2013).
136. See supra note 58 (giving examples drawn from Sequoia Capital and
Bessemer Partners portfolios).
137. Cf Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON & ORG. 53 (1986).
138. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013).
139. See, e.g., Daines, The Incorporation Choices oflPO Firms, supra note
36.
140. See Coates, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses, supra note 37.
141. See Fleischer & Staudt, The Supercharged IPO, supra note 37
(presenting evidence of the impact of professional networks on firms' use of a
specific planning strategy).
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In the corporation-versus-LLC context, the overwhelming adherence
of startups to the standard Delaware corporation organization advice offered
by lawyers and other gatekeepers has raised the question of whether the
default corporation approach is a rational or irrational habit. 14 2 The
corporation-versus-LLC question raises this issue because there are known
net tax costs presented by the corporate organizational form, whether it is the
loss of the benefit of tax losses or the cost of double taxation in the event of
profit. 143 In the US-versus-non-US incorporation case, however, the
rationality question is not broadly presented, because the choice of US
incorporation instead of non-US incorporation does not clearly result in net
tax costs for a typical startup and its investors. 14 4
Nevertheless, the influence of advisors over startups' US-versus-
non-US organization decision is important. For example, it influences the
analysis of what might happen in the event the US did (contrary to
predictions discussed below based on legislative process and interest group
constraints) increase the tax burden of US-parented MNCs relative to non-
US-parented MNCs. In the absence of a mediating group of advisors and in
the absence of a standard market norm for a startup's organizational
structure, an increase in the tax burden of US-parented MNCs should
marginally increase the frequency of US-based startups that incorporate
outside the US based on each individual startup's cost-benefit analysis.
However, if mediated by gatekeepers such as venture capitalists and
lawyers, the possible adoption of non-US-parented MNC startup structures in
response to a change in law is more complicated. One issue is agency costs.
The existing default Delaware incorporation structure optimizes various
142. Compare Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra
note 4, at 1767 (acknowledging transaction costs and loss limitations but also
suggesting various "irrational" possible reasons for corporate startup structure
including the possibility that "individual investors are irrationally attracted by the
remote possibility of enonnous return") and Johnson, Why Do Venture Capital
Funds Burn Research and Development Deductions, supra note 4, at 89 ("The
explanations offered on why the funds accept such high taxes do not justify or
explain the destruction of the tax benefits. The results cannot be justified by drafting
habits in a billion dollar fund because the stakes are too high to be justified by
inertia.") with Fleischer, The Rational Exuberance of Structuring Venture Capital,
supra note 4, at 139-140 (placing greater weight on transaction costs and loss
limitations including the fact that venture capitalists generally would not benefit
from startup losses).
143. Allen & Raghavan, The Impact of Non-Tax Costs on Tax-Efficiency,
supra note 4.
144. See, e.g., Shaviro, Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence,
supra note 2, at 383-84 (2011) (noting that the degree of electivity turns on a
comparison between tax advantages and "nontax consequences" such as corporate
governance).
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venture capital goals. Its widespread use may also reflect lawyers' aversion
to taking on the professional risk of recommending an untested structure.145
Another issue is collective action, since developing a new startup structure
norm might be worthwhile only if the new structure could be used for a large
number of clients.14 6
Both the agency cost issue and the collective action issue suggest
that significant path-dependent obstacles would block the development of a
new norm of non-US incorporation of US-based startups in reaction to a
tightening of US tax law applicable to US-parented MNCs. This applies in
particular to venture-backed startups because the advisor community that
serves these firms shows a strong commitment to a US-incorporation norm
for US-based firms. Gatekeeper network effects would influence any change
to the prevailing norm, including a change from a default of US
incorporation to a default of non-US incorporation. 14 7
D. Considering Future Law Changes
In the future, Congress could impose onerous tax rules on US-
parented MNCs.14 8 It also could impose onerous non-tax rules on US-
145. See Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market, supra note 35. Cf
Ruth Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity With the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE
L.J. 1267, 1323-24 (2013) (referencing other literature on the "stickiness" of
contract default terms).
146. See Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-Ups, supra note 4,
at 1767-68 (considering reduced transaction costs and venture capitalists' collective
action problem). See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
(1965).
147. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and
Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate'), 83 VA.
L. REv. 713, 729 (1997) (contending that "learning and network benefits" encourage
boilerplate and "path dependence"). Cf Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good
Citizens? An Economic Analysis ofInternalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1585-
87 (2000) (noting that social norms present the possibility of multiple equilibria in
part because of "fixed costs and network effects").
148. Courts have held that the Constitution does not prevent Congress from
imposing a full current tax on all of the income earned by non-US subsidiaries of US
parents. See, e.g., Garlock Inc. v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 197, 202-03 (2d Cir.
1973) (holding subpart F's current taxation of US shareholders Constitutional)
(citing Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 281 (1938) (holding Constitutional the
taxation of a partner on partnership distributive share regardless of "the fact that it
may not be currently distributable as a matter of state law")), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
911 (1974). See also Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) (rejecting the contention that
substantive due process concerns blocked the United State's ability to tax noncitizen
individuals); Flint v Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 151-52 (1911) (holding a
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parented MNCs. But available data does not suggest that startups place
importance on the possibility of future changes in US tax law that would be
adverse to US-parented MNC structures when they consider how to organize.
Several possible reasons may support this lack of concern.
Legislative process obstacles and interest group lobbying may block US
legal changes adverse to US-parented MNCs. Similar considerations may not
produce similarly formidable obstacles to legal change adverse to non-US-
parented MNCs, whether under US or non-US law. In addition, the
experience of US-based startups and their advisors with US law and legal
change may provide a greater degree of certainty about the low likelihood of
change in the United States, particularly with respect to change applicable to
US-parented structures.
US-based advisors have good reasons based on a significant body of
data to believe that legal changes adverse to a US-parented MNC structure
are unlikely. Legislators may hotly criticize MNC tax planning in public
hearings. 149 But Congressional policy goals also explicitly include
corporate income tax constitutional because of its nature as an excise tax, not a
"direct" tax subject to apportionment).
Several proposals for international corporate tax reform could, depending
on the details, increase the tax burden of US-parented multinationals. One option is
worldwide consolidation. See, e.g., Kleinbard, Stateless Income, supra note 7, at
152-55 (listing advantages of worldwide consolidation, including satisfaction of
capital export neutrality, solution to the problem of "stateless income," and finessing
of the "otherwise intractable" problems of transfer pricing and expense allocation).
Another is the imposition of a minimum tax on non-US subsidiaries' income. See
WHITE HOUSE & DEP'T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT'S FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS
TAx REFORM 14 (2012). A third option is territoriality, or dividend exemption. See
JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH. SERV., R42624, MOVING TO A TERRITORIAL
INCOME TAX: OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES (2012). This approach would permanently
exempt an MNC's non-US business income from US income tax. Territoriality is
generally presented as a business-friendly reform. However, its adoption could
produce increased taxes on US-parented multinationals depending on the details,
including choices about the disallowance of deductions such as overhead expense
allocable to non-tax business income and the inclusion of royalty income paid by
non-US subsidiaries to US parents. See CONG BUDGET OFFICE, OPTIONS FOR TAXING
U.S. MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 22 (2013) (citing expense allocation and
royalty taxation as possible sources of increased revenue). The current taxation of
low-taxed foreign income under territoriality or dividend exemption presents another
open question. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay,
Designing a U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury is
Empty, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 397 (2012).
149. See, e.g., Nelson D. Schwartz & Charles Duhigg, Apple's Web of Tax
Shelters Saved It Billions, Panel Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2013, at Al (reporting
on Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations hearing featuring Apple CEO
Tim Cook and Senator Carl Levin).
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"increas[ing] US competitiveness" and "reduc[ing] tax incentives for
multinationals to be foreign-based."150
In addition, the US legislative process presents sequential hurdles to
enactment and therefore favors the status quo.'5 ' In the area of corporate tax
law reform, agency costs further hamper change. For example, managers
face an incentive to favor policies like accelerated depreciation that provide
targeted incentives for new corporate investment, even though shareholders
prefer policies that also enrich existing investment. 152
Moreover, the heterogeneity of interests among different
corporations may strengthen the importance of interest group influence in the
area of corporate tax policy. This is because there is an incentive for
corporations that disproportionately benefit from a certain tax break to lobby
energetically to keep that tax break rather than supporting more general
reform proposals.153 While overall tax reform adverse to corporate interests is
possible, it is unusual.154 And when broad reform does occur, it faces the
prospect of later erosion.155
Startup lawyers, venture capitalists and entrepreneurs may be more
concerned about future law changes applicable to non-US parented MNCs.
Some future law changes that could affect non-US-parented structures would
arise under non-US law. In the informal interviews conducted, some concern
about the uncertain application of non-US law was expressed. It is possible
that startups and their advisors place a higher likelihood on the possibility of
such adverse non-US law change. They might do so because they perceive
150. SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE STAFF, TAX REFORM OPTIONS FOR
DISCUSSION: INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS 4 (May 9, 2013).
151. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH
GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 70 (2d ed. 2006) ("The
most salient aspect of the modem legislative process is that it is filled with a
complex set of hurdles that proponents of a new policy must overcome before their
bill becomes law.").
152. See Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of
Corporate Taxation, 105 YALE L.J. 325, 336-38 (1995) (arguing that managers have
incentives to favor policies that encourage additional investment or otherwise make
possible increases to individual returns such as salaries).
153. See Michael Doran, Managers, Shareholders and the Corporate
Double Tax, 95 VA. L. REV. 517, 536-42 (2009) (citing "unevenness resulting from
the different use of corporate tax preferences, interest deductions, and tax shelters").
See also MARTIN SULLIVAN, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: TAXING PROFITS IN THE
21ST CENTURY (2011) (explaining some interest group and other concerns that make
reform unlikely).
154. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A
Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1990).
155. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery & Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at
Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L. REv. 1159 (2006).
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relatively lower legislative process constraints outside the United States,
where fewer legislative process obstacles to change may exist, for example
in parliamentary systems.
Other future law changes that could affect non-US-parented MNCs
would arise under US law. In the tax area, the anti-inversion rule of section
7874 provides a prominent example of a US statute that targets a non-US-
parented structure. Under this statute, a standalone firm with a parent
incorporated in the United States generally cannot invert into a non-US-
parented structure respected as such for US tax purposes absent substantial
business activities in the country where the new parent is incorporated.'56
Other proposals could tighten earnings-stripping rules and limit the ability of
US subsidiaries of non-US parents to erode US tax bases via deductible
payments such as interest and royalties; 57 impose a mind-and-management
residence rule to replace the current place-of-incorporation rule;' or impose
a higher rate on dividends paid to US shareholders from non-US corporations
compared to dividends from US corporations.159 If non-US-parented MNCs
are less effective than US-parented MNCs at lobbying Congress, anti-
foreign-corporation proposals like these may have a greater chance of
enactment relative to proposals that impose more onerous requirements on
US-parented firms. 160
Another possibility is that uncertainty aversion causes a higher level
of concern about the possibility of change adverse to a non-US-parented
156. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (analyzing I.R.C. §
7874).
157. A series of administration proposals made by both the Bush and
Obama administrations would significantly limit the deductibility of interest expense
paid by US subsidiaries to foreign parents established in an inversion transaction.
See Solomon, Corporate Inversions: A Symptom of Larger Tax System Problems,
supra note 20, at 1451-52.
158. One example is legislation that would change the corporate tax
residence rule from place-of-incorporation to place of management and control or
place of listing. See Omri Y. Marian, Jurisdiction to Tax Corporations, 54 B.C. L.
REV. _ (forthcoming 2013), manuscript at 45 (identifying proposals to change US
corporate residence rule), 51-53 (advocating US residence status for corporations
managed and controlled in the United States or listed on a US exchange).
159. Currently, dividends from "qualified foreign corporations," meaning
dividends on publicly traded stock or dividends from corporations eligible for the
benefits of a satisfactory comprehensive income tax treaty, are taxed at the
preferential rate under section 1(h) that also applies to dividends from US
corporations. I.R.C. § l(h)(1 1)(C).
160. See, e.g., David Rogers, Capital Climate Discomfits Multinationals -
Business Frauds, Patriotic Fever Dominate Debates on Offshore Havens, Tax
Breaks, WALL ST. J., July 25, 2002, at A4 (reporting the issue of anti-inversion
legislation in the wake of Stanley Works' effort to reincorporate in Bermuda as an
potent congressional campaign issue).
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structure.16 1 There are numerous data points related to the possibility of
Congressional change adverse to US-parented MNCs. US-based advisors
have access to fewer data points related to the possibility of either US or
non-US change adverse to non-US parented MNCs.
For example, US advisors may be able to predict likely
Congressional action related to the repeated renewal of specific tax breaks.
"Look-through" rules for payments between related controlled foreign
corporations and the subpart F active financing exception provide two
current examples of provisions that US-parented MNCs regularly lobby to
preserve to ensure that their treatment under the existing set of rules does not
worsen.162 The repeated renewal of such tax breaks provides ample
opportunity to observe corporate interest groups' ability to lobby and
influence legislation and to support a conclusion on the part of advisors and
161. Uncertainty aversion describes a preference for avoiding situations in
which the chances of different possible outcomes are unknown. See David
Schmeidler, Subjective Probability and Expected Utility Without Additivity, 57
ECONOMETRICA 571 (1989); see also Larry G. Epstein, A Definition of Uncertainty
Aversion, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 579 (1999). Uncertainty aversion can be analyzed
separately from risk aversion, which refers to a preference for avoiding situations in
which the outcome is not known, but the chances of different possible outcomes are
known. See Frank H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY & PROFIT Part III Ch VIII (1921)
(using "risk" to mean a measurable or mathematical uncertainty like that faced in a
game of chance and "uncertainty" to mean an unmeasurable uncertainty). See also
KENNETH J. ARROW, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING (1965) (providing
risk aversion model); Sarah B. Lawsky, Modeling Uncertainty in Tax Law, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 241, 259-61 (2013) (citing Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage
Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643 (1961)). The impact of uncertainty about future law
changes has been considered broadly. See, e.g., Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats,
61 STAN. L. REV. 629 (2008). Some tax research has focused on uncertainty under
steady-state policies. For example, Sarah Lawsky has pointed out that a taxpayer's
uncertainty aversion may function as a built-in penalty. Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably?
Understanding Tax Law's Uncertainty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1073 (2009)
("[T]heoretical models of tax compliance may benefit from taking into account an
additional aspect of deterrence: the built-in penalty that is uncertainty."). Others have
considered the interaction between penalties and uncertainty aversion. See Mark P.
Gergen, Uncertainty and Tax Enforcement: A Case for Moderate Fault-Based
Penalties, 64 TAX L. REV. 453, 472 (2011) (considering solutions to the problem that
a penalty may overdeter particularly uncertainty-averse taxpayers and underdeter
others); Kyle D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law is
Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241, 293-96 (2007) (analyzing strict liability and fault-
based tax penalty structures assuming legal uncertainty).
162. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council, NFTC Urges
Congress to Pass Tax Extenders Legislation, (March 15, 2012) (urging renewal of
both provisions on competitiveness grounds).
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investors that a change adverse to the interests of US-parented MNCs is
certainly unlikely.
Advisors likely face a higher degree of uncertainty related to the
possibility of laws penalizing non-US-parented MNCs. In the United States,
there are few data points related to proposed laws targeting non-US-parented
firms. In addition, US-based advisors may know less about likely future
changes in law in other jurisdictions. If so, higher uncertainty about the
likely changes to laws affecting non-US MNCs could discourage use of the
non-US MNC structure even if such a structure were advantageous from a
tax perspective.
V. THEORIZING THE EXCEPTIONS: WHAT FACILITATES A
NON-US PARENT STRUCTURE?
A. Tax Factors
Because more mature and profitable firms are likely to benefit more
from a non-US-parented structure, tax factors in general will present more
advantages for some firms as opposed to others. The structure used by
Bermuda-parented corporations that primarily insure US risks provides an
example of the potential power of tax factors to encourage non-US
incorporation.163 The Bermuda parent of a US insurance subsidiary must
skirt several sets of rules to ensure that it will not be subject to US income
tax on insurance or re-insurance premiums it receives.'64 First, it must avoid
the US rules that tax non-US persons on net income "effectively connected
with a US business."l 65 Second, it must avoid the US rules that tax non-US
persons by imposing a 30 percent withholding tax on gross "fixed or
determinable, annual or periodic," or FDAP, income.166
Bermuda-parented MNCs that insure US risks achieve the first goal,
related to avoiding effectively connected income treatment, with the help of
a US-Bermuda tax treaty that provides a taxpayer favorable "permanent
163. Nontax regulatory factors, such as the opportunity to take advantage
of less stringent investment standards, may also encourage tax-haven incorporation.
See Thomas St.G. Bissell, A Comparison of the U.S. Tax Rules for U.S. and Offshore
Insurance Products, 32 TAX MGMT. INT'L J. 14 (2003).
164. It must also avoid treatment as a passive foreign investment company,
or "PFIC." This is accomplished by application of the active insurance exception to
the PFIC rules. See I.R.C. § 1297(b)(2)(A) and (B); David S. Miller, How U.S. Tax
Law Encourages Investment Through Tax Havens, TAX NOTES 167, 173-75 (Apr.
11, 2011) (explaining application of PFIC exception to offshore insurance
companies and listing twenty-one publicly traded offshore reinsurance companies).
165. See I.R.C. § 882.
166. See I.R.C. §§ 881(a) (imposing 30 percent tax on FDAP), 1441
(imposing withholding obligation).
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establishment" provision.16 7 Permanent establishment rules in treaties allow
taxpayers from one treaty jurisdiction (here, Bermuda) to establish more of a
presence in the other treaty jurisdiction (here, the US) before the other treaty
jurisdiction is permitted to impose income tax. 168 The Bermuda-US tax treaty
provides among other things that the maintenance of a regular place of
business "solely for the purpose of . . . collecting information, for the
enterprise of insurance; or ... advertising [or] for the supply of information,.
. . for the enterprise" will not constitute a permanent establishment, even if
carried on by a wholly-owned subsidiary, so long as the subsidiary is
compensated on an arm's length basis.169 This does not diverge substantially
from the usual permanent establishment definitions in bilateral tax treaties,
but it fails to acknowledge that the elements of the insurance business other
than the giving and receiving of information can be carried on more easily
from afar compared to many other businesses. In addition, it is unusual for
the US and a tax haven jurisdiction like Bermuda to conclude a tax treaty
that includes a permanent establishment or "business income" provision.
Bermuda-parented MNCs avoid FDAP taxation despite the fact that
the applicable statute includes US-source "premiums" in the list of items to
be taxed;170 and premiums paid to insure US risks are US source income. A
revenue ruling states that an excise tax applicable to premiums paid to a
foreign insurer supersedes the FDAP tax, and that the FDAP tax substitutes
for the collection of income tax. The excise tax charges four percent of
property and casualty premiums and one percent of reinsurance, life
insurance and other policy type premiums.172
The prevalence of the Bermuda-parented insurance structure
suggests that the premium excise tax produces a lighter tax burden than the
imposition of US corporate income tax on net income would. A 1990
Treasury study used a model to confirm this result.173 A key element of the
167. See William P. Elliott, A Guide to Captive Insurance Companies, 16 J.
INT'L TAX'N 22 (2005).
168. See JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION (3d ed. 2010).
169. U.S.A-Bermuda Insurance Income Tax Convention Act art. 3, Aug.
29, 1986.
170. See I.R.C. §§ 881(a) (imposing 30 percent tax on FDAP), 1441
(imposing withholding obligation).
171. See Rev. Rul. 89-91, 1989-2 C.B. 129.
172. See I.R.C. § 4371.
173. See U.S. TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EFFECT ON U.S.
REINSURANCE CORPORATIONS OF THE WAIVER BY TREATY OF THE EXCISE TAX ON
CERTAIN REINSURANCE PREMIUMS (Apr. 2, 1990) Tables 3, 4, 5 (showing top
profitability in no-tax jurisdiction under almost all sets of assumptions under any of
a 0 percent, I percent or 4 percent premium excise tax).
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advantaged Bermuda-parented insurance structure is that investment income
resulting from invested premiums is not subject to tax. 174
B. Nontax Legal Factors
Nontax legal factors also help explain why some non-US
incorporation locations may be more favored than others. Marine
transportation firms that are headquartered in the United States and
incorporated outside the United States provide an example of an industry
whose non-US organization decisions appear to be driven by various tax and
nontax legal factors. Online gaming provides another example of an industry
influenced by nontax legal factors.
US law exempts income derived from the international operation of
a ship if it is earned by a foreign corporation resident in a country that
declines to tax similar income earned by US corporations.175 In addition,
although some commerce, such as "coastwise" shipping between two US
ports, is limited to US-flagged vessels,'7 6 the use of non-US flagships in
international commerce including calls at US ports is permitted and provides
several nontax regulatory advantages. These include the ability to use a non-
US shipyard for vessel construction as well as the possible avoidance of
applicable labor regulations, union contracts,17 7 and a choice of law doctrine
that may require a US forum in the event of worker injury.
Online gambling firms may have had even stronger reasons to
incorporate offshore. There is not yet a regulatory framework for online
gambling in the United States and for some time its legality was in question
in the United States, for example because of potential liability under the Wire
174. See NYSBA, OUTBOUND INVERSION TRANSACTIONS REPORT, supra
note 25, at 28.
175. See I.R.C. § 883(a)(1); Peter A. Glicklich & Michael J. Miller, U.S.
TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING AND AIR TRANSPORT ACTIVITIES, 954 TAX
MGMT. (BLOOMBERG/BNA) PORTFOLIO 945 (2012).
176. See Timothy Semenoro, The State of Our Seafaring Nation: What
Course Has Congress Laid for the US. Maritime Industry?, 25 TUL. MAR. L.J. 355,
358 (2000).
177. Id. at 368-69.
178. See GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES LUND BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF
ADMIRALTY (2d ed. 1975). Leading flag jurisdictions such as Liberia and Panama
undertake to both provide satisfactory vessel safety and inspection requirements and
also facilitate more cost-effective construction and operation. See, e.g., Brad
Berman, Does the UNCTAD Convention on the Registration of Ships Need
Amending?, http://www.itfglobal.org/seafarers/icons-site/images/120BERMAN.pdf
(emphasizing Liberian commitment to safety standards).
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Act and the Unlawful Internet Gaming Enforcement Act of 2006.179 One
leading company incorporated in Gibraltar conducted an IPO on the London
Stock Exchange in 2005 using a proxy statement that reportedly disclosed
that 90 percent of its customers were US.'s 0 In 2011, the Justice Department
provided guidance that permits states to legalize online gaming.'81 This
raises the question of whether online gaming companies will continue to
organize outside the United States.1 82
C. Liquidity and Other Resource Constraints
The description in Part IV of startups' reasons for incorporating in
Delaware under the default approach emphasized liquidity and other resource
constraints. This suggests that if a startup had plentiful cash and other
resources and did not need to depend upon venture capital financing, it
would be more likely to depart from the default Delaware corporation
structure. The presence of corporate- and individual-funded startups in the
IPO data set, as discussed above, is consistent with this suggestion. 83
Similarly, one startup lawyer said that non-US incorporation might follow if
a founder was a serial entrepreneur who had had the prior experience of a
significant tax hit on a previous investment and who was confident about the
availability of financing.184 Another lawyer explained that he would not set
such a structure up on a deferred fee basis, but would do so if the client paid
"full freight." 85
A desire to access capital markets in the future might prompt
organization as a non-US firm in order to make a future acquisition
transaction attractive to a strategic acquirer who preferred to use offshore
179. See Nelson Rose & Rebecca Bolin, Game on for Internet Gambling:
With Federal Approval, States Line Up to Place Their Bets, 45 CoNN. L. REv. 653,
657-69 (2012) [hereinafter Rose & Bolin, Game on for Internet Gambling]
(explaining historic legal landscape).
180. See Hurt, Regulating Public Morals, supra note 63, at 415 (reporting
on PartyGaming IPO).
181. See Rose & Bolin, Game on for Internet Gambling, supra note 179, at
674-84 (outlining likely state action regarding licensing of online gambling).
182. Cf Matthew Garrahan, US States Make Play for Global Gaming, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 2013, at 15 (reporting that states may enter into international
regulatory compacts with respect to the regulation of online gambling).
183. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
184. Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley law firm partner (Feb. 4,
2013). One founder reported refusing venture capital funding for a second startup,
organizing it as an LLC, and considering a non-US parent structure. Telephone
Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Feb. 11, 2013).
185. Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16,
2013).
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cash. The results of informal interviews did not suggest that this factor is
thought to affect startup company valuation.'86 However, it arguably has
affected valuation in some acquisitions.
Skype provides a good example, although it is not a pure startup
example.187 Microsoft bought Skype, an MNC with a corporate parent
resident in Luxembourg, where the corporate tax is 0.4 percent, from a
private equity consortium including Silver Lake Partners and from eBay in
2011.188 The price was $8.5 billion. Microsoft's ability to forecast a low tax
rate for Skype profits and its ability to use offshore cash for the acquisition
without paying any residual repatriation tax may have enabled it to pay much
more than it would have been able to pay otherwise.1 89
D. Investor Preferences
A number of tax-haven-incorporated firms in the IPO data set had
investors or founders with links to a non-US jurisdiction. Some tax factors
correlate with this result. For example, a non-US investor does not face any
PFIC risk as a result of holding non-US company stock. In addition, the laws
applicable in the non-US investor's country and the country of incorporation
will determine outcomes including treaty benefits such as withholding tax
relief, and tax reporting requirements. These may be more favorable than
those prescribed by US law.
186. E.g., Telephone Interview with Silicon Valley entrepreneur (Feb. 11,
2013) (remarking that pharmaceutical companies really care about the technology);
Telephone Interview with San Francisco law firm partner (Feb. 16, 2013)
(expressing doubt that an offshore structure would affect valuation).
187. A similar example is provided by the 1994 acquisition of Syntex, a
Silicon Valley firm, by Roche Holdings Ltd. See Milt Freudenheim, Roche Set to
Acquire Syntex, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at DI, D6 (reporting that Syntex was
based in Palo Alto and incorporated in Panama). Roche Holdings Ltd. was a Swiss
corporation; it owned a non-resident Canadian corporation, which owned the
acquiring company, a Panama corporation. See Syntex Corp., Tender Offer
Statement (Schedule 14D-lA) (Sept. 9, 1994),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/96000/0000950103-94-003492.txt.
188. See Richard Waters, Tim Bradshaw & Maija Palmer, Microsoft in
$8.5bn Skype Deal, FIN. TIMES, May 10, 2011, at 1 (reporting profit of $5 billion for
the investors who had purchased 70 percent of Skype eighteen months before the
announcement of the Microsoft deal).
189. See Ronald Barusch, Microsoft's Brilliant, Legal Tax Dodge, WALL
ST. J. DEALPOLITIK (May 11, 2011, 2:59 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/05/11 /dealpolitik-lesson-from-microsoftskype-
congress-must-fix-corporate-tax-law/ (estimating deal price of $5.5 billion if Skype
"had been a Delaware corporation run out of Silicon Valley" and Microsoft had used
offshore cash).
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Non-US connections also mitigate some of the risks presented by a
non-US incorporation structure. Venture firms that focus on particular non-
US sectors often use non-US incorporation jurisdictions in those sectors, for
example. Their local presence may reduce legal risks, for example those
related to the ability to pursue court remedies in the event of controversy.
In addition, non-US connections support easier access to local, non-
US attorneys, which can reverse the gatekeeper effects that cause US lawyers
to recommend Delaware incorporation. A local Indian or Israeli lawyer, for
example, is likely to recommend Indian or Israeli incorporation. A local
Chinese lawyer may recommend that a firm follow a familiar structure that
uses a parent company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands.' 90
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article, consistent with previous literature and with the support
of additional informal interview results, presents the default norm of US
incorporation, in particular Delaware incorporation, for US-based startups.
The US incorporation structure dominates. However, there are exceptions to
the general rule, for example in the insurance, marine transportation and
online gambling industries and in isolated cases where resources permit and
investors prefer a non-US incorporation structure.
This Article theorizes the dominant structure. It explains that US-
parented MNCs can often achieve tax-advantaged structures and may obtain
other valued corporate governance and other legal advantages. In addition,
liquidity and other resource constraints support US incorporation for many
startups. The dominant structure is particularly entrenched because advisors
to startup firms, in particular lawyers, firmly embrace it.
This Article also theorizes the exceptions to the dominant structure.
Some US-based, non-US incorporated firms, including insurance firms, may
make their organizational choice because of the tax advantages of non-US
incorporation. Other US-based, non-US incorporated firms, including marine
190. Historically, legislative restrictions relating to foreign ownership of
Chinese firms, shareholder and creditor rights and listing approval made non-US
ownership relatively attractive. See Nicholas Calcina Howson & Vikramaditya S.
Khanna, The Development of Modern Corporate Governance in China and India, in
CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 513, 542-45
(Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Jiangyu Wang eds. 2010). Tax havens may have
provided corporate governance advantages as well as tax advantages. See Dhammika
Dharmapala & James R. Hines, Jr., Which Countries Become Tax Havens, 93 J. PUB.
EcON. 1058 (2009). Finally, substantial foreign direct investment tax incentives
existed until 2007 and were available if investment was made through a non-Chinese
corporation. See Jinyan Li, The Rise and Fall of Chinese Tax Incentives and
Implications for International Tax Debates, 8 FLA. TAX REv. 669 (2007).
3592013]
360 Florida Tax Review [Vol. 14:8
transportation and online gambling firms, may make their organizational
choice because of non-tax legal advantages of non-US incorporation, as well
as any tax advantages. Lower resource constraints and investor preference
for non-US incorporation, for example because of independent sources of
capital and/or business links to the jurisdiction of incorporation, also
facilitate the incorporation of a US-based firm in a non-US jurisdiction.
